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EMBEDDING JOURNALISTS 
IN MILITARY COMBAT UNITS: 
IMPACT ON NEWSPAPER STORY FRAMES 
AND TONE 
By Michael Pfau, Michel Haigh, Mitchell Gettle, Michael Donnelly, 
Gregory Scoff, Dana Warr, and Elaine Wiffenberg 
This investigation probed whether embedded journalist coverage of 
thefirst days of the 2003 U.S. invasion of lraq produced print news 
coverage that was either more decontextualized in form or morefavor- 
able in tone. Embedded news coverage of the first days of Operation 
“lraui Freedom” was compared to nonembedded, so-called ”unilateral” 
covehge; and print coverdge of “lraqi Freedom” was compared with the 
first days of U S .  ground operations in 0perations”Enduring Freedom” 
and “Desert Storm.” The results indicated that embedded journalists 
in Operation “lraqi Freedom” produced news stories that featured 
more episodic frames, compared to both nonembedded reporters in 
“lraqi Freedom” and overall coverage of Operation ”Enduring Free- 
dom.” The results also revealed that, compared to nonembedded 
reporting, embedded print coverage of “lraqi Freedom” was more 
favorable in overall tone toward the military and in depiction of indi- 
vidual troops, but this bias did not produce more positive overall 
coverage compared to recent conflicts. 
~ 
The US. military took an unprecedented step in military/news 
cooperation during the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Operation ”Iraqi Free- 
dom”) by adopting a strategy of systematically embedding journalists in 
combat units. The military defines an embed ”as a media representative 
remaining with a unit on an extended basis.“‘ Embeds were expected to 
“live, work and travel as part of the units with which they are embedded 
to facilitate maximum, in-depth coverage of U.S. forces in combat and 
related operations.”2 The strategy of embedding journalists in combat 
units was ”spearheaded” by Victoria Clark, a former public relations 
executive who served as senior spokesperson for Secretary of Defense 
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Donald Rumsfield at the outset of ”Iraqi Freed~m.”~The question posed 
in this investigation is whether the practice of embedding produces print 
news coverage that is either more decontextualized in form or more 
favorable in tone. 
The practice of embedding journalists in military units is not new. 
It has been used on a limited basis in previous conflicts. However, the 
scope of embedding in Operation Iraqi Freedom was ”massive,” involv- 
ing more than 600 US. and foreign journalists4 at a cost to participating 
news outlets of about $100 mi l l i~n .~  Journalists “have never ... worked 
a1ongsideU.S. military units ... in such numbers [or] in such an organized 
fashion.”6 The scale of embedding employed in Operation Iraqi Freedom 
was “unprecedented for the opening stages of a conflict involving the 
United  state^."^ It offered a first-hand, up-close view of combat missions 
that was unavailable to unilateral (unembedded) or pool reporters. 
It is unclear what motivated Pentagon officials to take this step. In 
part, the decision to embed may have been defensive, a strategy to 
preempt opposition attempts to spread outright lies and misinformation 
about the US.  operation.8 As Bryan Whitman, deputy assistant secretary 
of defense for media operations, noted: ”We recognized early on that we 
needed to make truth an issue should there be a military campaign 
because Saddam Hussein was a practiced liar, a master of deception,” 
and the only way to defend against that is through “objective third-party 
accounts from professional  observer^."^ 
The decision may have been motivated by the sincere desire of 
military officials to “facilitate access of national and international media 
to our forces.”1o Whitman continued: ”We also believed Americans 
deserved to see exactly how well trained their military forces were, how 
dedicated and professional.”” Clark, the director of Pentagon public 
affairs at the outset of Operation “Iraqi Freedom,” suggested both of 
these motivations. ”People around the world got to see the US. military 
in a very real and compelling way ... they saw the compassion with which 
they prosecuted this war.”12 In either case, this more transparent ap- 
proach constitutes a complete “about face” from recent military restric- 
tions on journalist access to combat, which was a point of considerable 
contention during US. military operations in Grenada, Panama, and 
Afghani~tan.’~ 
Or, the Pentagon decision to facilitate journalists’ access to combat 
operations may have been motivated by a conscious attempt to slant 
news coverage. The 1982 Falklands War between the United Kingdom 
and Argentina offered a precedent in embedding. In the Falklands War, 
the journalists embedded with British forces far from home “were 
completely reliant on the military, not only for access to the battle zone, 
but for food, shelter, protection, and transmission of their  report^."'^ This 
dependence ”created an esprit de corps between the journalists and the 
military” that resulted in identification, even “camaraderie,” with mili- 
tary forces, which may have played some role in the favorable news 
coverage of British forces that emerged from the ~0nflict.I~ 
Reaction of journalists to embedding was positive, but with the 
caveat that reporters must maintain perspective. Reporters appreciated 
the access to combat operations, which many thought would produce ”a 
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more complete picture” of the war than was available in recent U.S. 
conflicts.16 One reporter retrospectively praised embedding as ”the most 
innovative aspect of coverage” of Iraqi Freedom, producing news cover- 
age of the war that was ”intimate, immediate, absorbing, almost addic- 
tive.”17 
The caveat, that embedded journalists must maintain perspective, 
was perceived as a difficult challenge. The challenge of maintaining 
perspective involves two dimensions. First, there is the obvious danger 
that journalists could become too close to the fighting men and women 
they are covering. One reporter described embedding as ”professionally 
treacherous,” explaining that ”There is a real danger of getting too close 
to your subject.”18 Another referred to embedding as producing a varia- 
tion of the ”Stockholm Syndrome,” in which journalists become depen- 
dent for their own survival on the soldiers they are covering and, as a 
result, ”become enamored” of them and ”lose perspe~tive.”’~ Second, 
there is the possibility that embedding might produce a narrow, 
decontextualized coverage of war. Embedding affords an ”extremely 
deep, rich coverage of what’s going on in a particular unit,”20 what might 
be called ”the minutiae of the conflict,”21 or “a little slice of grunt-level 
reality.“22 A television news executive questioned how much embedded 
journalists saw, concluding that, ”It’s arguable they didn’t see a double- 
digit percentage of what happened.”23 What is lost in such micro cover- 
age is the big picture: ”insight into the purpose and context” of individual 
missions within the context of the broader war.24 
Unfortunately, the available evidence as to whether journalists 
maintained perspective in their coverage of Operation “Iraqi Freedom” 
is largely anecdotal, based on the personal opinions of journalists or 
academics. This investigation attempted to address both aspects of this 
question of journalist perspective. Specifically, the study probes whether 
embedded journalist coverage of the first days of the 2003 US.  invasion 
of Iraq produced print news coverage that was either more 
decontextualized in form or more favorable in tone. Print news coverage 
of the first days of Operation ”Iraqi Freedom” was compared to both: 
coverage of the first days of ”Desert Storm,” the start of ground opera- 
tions in the 1991 Gulf War, and Operation ”Enduring Freedom,” the 2002 
U.S. invasion of Afghanistan; and unilateral (unembedded) coverage of 
Operation “Iraqi Freedom.” This investigation anticipated finding both 
biases (decontextualization and favorableness) in embedded coverage. 
Hypotheses The very nature of embedded coverage should produce more 
decontextualized coverage, which focuses on specific military units and 
personnel instead of overarching context and analysis. Journalists frame 
news stories; that is, they package stories and, in the process of doing so, 
give stories meaningz5 Framing is about the choices that journalists make 
in the reporting of stories.26 Journalists’ choices, in turn, affect the way 
that stories are interpreted by consumers of newsz7 As Price and 
Tewksbury explain, the way stories are packaged “systematically affect[s] 
how political events are perceived by the public. [Frames] alter 
the...considerations people use in forming their opinions.”2s 
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Although framing can be approached in a variety of ways, Iyengar 
describes two broad framing approaches that are particularly relevant to 
this investigation. He distinguishes episodic and thematic frames.29 
”Episodic framing seeks to personalize issues,” whereas ”thematic fram- 
ing presents collective or general evidence” about issues?O Episodic 
frames are based on compelling exemplars; they ”are essentially illustra- 
tive of issues.”31 Thematic frames provide more ”in-depth, interpretive 
analysis.”32 They depict issues ”more broadly and abstractly by placing 
them in some appropriate context-historical, geographical, or other- 
wise.”33 Iyengar argues that television news relies more heavily on 
episodic instead of thematic frames for a number of reasons: perhaps the 
most important reason is the visual nature of the medium, which places 
a premium on individual exemplars; another reason is the reduced 
demand for reporter subject-matter expertise with use of episodic as 
opposed to thematic reports.34 
This study argues that the nature of embedding reporters in 
combat units in war is a special circumstance that should produce 
episodic framing of news stories regardless of whether stories are carried 
via television or print. The reason is the intrinsic nature of embedding. 
Embedded reporters are attached to specific units for extended periods, 
literally isolated from the broader war. As Pentagon spokesperson Bryan 
Whiteman explained: ”Embedding means living, eating, moving in 
combat with the unit that you are attached to .... A reporter embeds for 
life,”35 meaning that, once attached, reporters are not permitted to 
change assignments. What an embedded reporter experiences is ”a very 
narrow view of what‘s going what one reporter termed ”a snap- 
shot.”37 The problem is that individual embedded reporters lose context. 
They offer depth of coverage about their unit, but no broader context, 
what Kaplan characterized as”vertica1 depthbut little horizontal scope.”38 
He explains that: ”Profound portraits of individual soldiers were rarely 
complemented by placing the various military operations in the context 
of a grand strategic view.”39 Murray and Scales maintain that news 
reports offered ”little insight into the purpose and context of ...missions.”40 
Ledbetter notes that, “no single slice of the war can give you the big 
picture”41 and, as a result, context and analysis were ”largely missing” 
from many of the Operation ”Iraqi Freedom” news reports.42 This is 
precisely what happened with embedded news reports during the 
Falklands War. Embedding “led to an emphasis on the minutiae of the 
conflict at the expense of the big picture.”43 Embedding inherently 
produces episodic news reporting; it is incapable of more. As one 
reporter commented about embedding during Operation ”Iraqi Free- 
dom”: ”Being so close to a particular unit made it nearly impossible to see 
the full scope of the war or its po l i t i~s .”~~ Hence, this study predicts: 
H1: Compared to nonembedded coverage, embed- 
ded journalist newspaper stories about the military, its units, 
and personnel are more episodic in nature. 
Embedded coverage of the first days of Operation ”Iraqi Freedom” 
should also produce print news coverage that is more favorable in tone, 
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both toward the military generally and toward its personnel. This 
expectation is based on the fact that embedding, de facto, makes journal- 
ists members, albeit temporarily, of individual military units. As a result, 
journalists will come to know the troops they are covering and, to some 
degree, internalize the values of the military unit they are embedded in. 
Knowing the troops they are covering can lead to bias in news 
coverage of the military and its personnel. Social Penetration Theory 
offers an explanation of how interpersonal relationships unfold and the 
implications of developing relationship^.^^ Relationships develop through 
contact, which makes possible increasing self-disclosure. Self-disclosure 
involves sharing of information about oneself with another, which 
facilitates social ~ene t r a t ion .~~  Relationships begin with relatively lim- 
ited breadth and depth but, through increasing self-disclosure, develop 
in intensity and intimacy.47 This process normally requires time, but 
when military units engage in combat, termed “hot conditions,“ the 
bonding of personnel Assuming that participants in a 
relationship experience a mutually favorable reward-cost 
close contact with another person triggers a spiraling process, one in 
which increasing levels of self-disclosure elicit more liking, and greater 
liking, in turn, produces even more self-disclosure.50 An inevitable by- 
product of social penetration is relational which can bias percep- 
tions.52 
If journalists internalize the values of the military unit they are 
embedded in, the potential for biased news coverage increases. The 
organizational culture metaphor offers an explanation for how this can 
happen. Organizational culture consists of “a pattern of shared basic 
assumptions that ...[ are] taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and As such, it imposes conventions, which 
invite conformity to the values that are unique to the organization’s 
culture.54 Organizational culture “serves as a mechanism of social con- 
tr01.”~~ As Beyer, Hannah, and Milton explain, ”when people adopt 
identities that tie them to a particular group of people, they become more 
susceptible to the ideas and feelings generated within that 
Pacanowsky and O’Donnell-Trujillo describe enculturation as the 
process in which the members of an organization ”acquire the social 
knowledge and skills necessary to behave as component members.”57 
Enculturation occurs in all organizations, but its effects are far more 
pronounced in military organizations, especially when confronting life- 
threatening situations. In these circumstances, ”there is a strong need for 
a so-called collective mind.”58 
But would the process of enculturation affect embedded reporters 
assigned to military units for a short period? We think so, especially 
because of the combat conditions. Some degree of acceptance of the 
values of military culture is essential in embedding. For example, em- 
beds, just like the military personnel they are serving with, must submit 
to military commands or place lives in jeopardy. To commence the 
process of enculturation, the military encouraged American journalists 
to train in military bootcamps before embedding; 238 journalists did 
For these and other embeds, the intensity of experiencing combat further 
facilitated enculturation.60 As Soeters explains, “In general, the organiza- 
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tion-in-action is characterized by ’swift trust,’ which is a manifestation of 
bonding among team members.” He adds: ”Swift trust is more likely to 
occur when uncertainty is high and the situation is unfamiliar and 
dangerous.”61 In essence, journalists embed both in a military unit and its 
culture: the two are virtually inseparable. The process of enculturation in 
combat conditions ensures that, to some degree, embedded journalists 
will be affected by a military unit‘s values, including: “shared meaning, 
shared understanding, and shared sense making.”62 
There is anecdotal evidence that embedded journalists developed 
personal relationships with the troops they covered and that they par- 
tially internalized the values of the military units they were assigned to. 
One embedded reporter described the process of journalists becoming 
combatants as ”professionally treacherous. You are sleeping next to the 
people you are covering. Your survival is based on them.“63 Another 
correspondent proclaimed: ”We absolutely want our unit to be success- 
ful. Are we are emotionally invested? We are. We know these people.”64 
As a result, TV embeds often used the pronoun “we”in their stories of the 
U.S. march to Baghdad, “almost sounding as if they were fellow sol- 
d i e r ~ . ” ~ ~  Thompson argues that this outcome was inevitable. “When you 
are part of the troops that you are going in with, these are your fellow 
human beings. You are being potentially shot at together, and I think that 
there is a sense that you are becoming part of that group in a way that a 
journalist doesn‘t necessarily want to be.”66 
Did this produce bias? It was charged that ”feelings of camarade- 
rie” affected objectivity during the Falklands War. A British journalist 
asserted that the desire to please the military and friendliness with 
individual soldiers can affect journalist independence, imposing a form 
of ”self- cen~orship.”~~ Morrison and Tumber said that there was “no 
escaping the military’s embrace.” They explain: ”It was not just a ques- 
tion of sharing the moods of the troops through shared experience, but 
of actively beginning to identify with them....”6s This investigation 
anticipated more favorable print news coverage of the first days of 
Operation ”Iraqi Freedom:” 
H2: Compared to nonembedded coverage, embed- 
ded journalists produce more positive newspaper stories 
about (a) the military generally, and (b) its personnel. 
H3: Compared to coverage of Operations ”Desert 
Storm” and “Enduring Freedom,“ newspaper stories about 
Operation ”Iraqi Freedom” manifest more positive bias to- 
ward the military. 
To test the study’s predictions, we conducted a content analysis of 
newspaper coverage of ground operations during the first five days of 
Operation ”Iraqi Freedom” (20 to 24 March 2003), Operation ”Enduring 
Freedom” (7 to 11 October 2001), and Operation ”Desert Storm” (24 to 28 
February 1991).69 The newspapers chosen for analyses were the New York 
Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and Chicago Tribune. The New 
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York Times and Washington Post were chosen because of their national 
influence. Both exert considerable influence in political and military 
circles and both are “newspapers of record” in that they shape the 
agendas of other newspapers. The Los Angeles Times and Chicago Tribune 
were chosen because of their influence in the West and Midwest, respec- 
tively, thereby providing geographical balance. 
The analysis focused on newspaper articles about military combat 
operations contained within the “national,” ”international,” and “local” 
sections, including the front page of the paper. Complete articles were 
used in the analysis. 
The unit of analysis was each article (n=291). Four Department of 
Defense public affairs personnel, who were enrolled in a communication 
course at a Midwestern university, conducted the content analysis. 
Coding norms were established during a one-hour training session using 
articles about combat operations that were published outside of the five- 
day window of the investigation. Researchers were paired for coding. 
Intercoder reliability was computed on the first 20 articles coded by each 
pair using Holsti’s formula of the ratio of agreement among coder pairs,7O 
a simple and appropriate reliability measure.71 Intercoder reliability 
ranged from 875 to 1.0 across variables.72 
The study featured two independent variables: reporter status and 
the particular war. Reporter status was coded based on information 
provided in each article as embedded, nonembedded (termed “unilat- 
eral“ during Operation Iraqi Freedom”), and unknown. As noted, the 
wars examined were Operation “Iraqi Freedom,” Operation ”Enduring 
Freedom,” and Operation ”Desert Storm.” 
The investigation featured three dependent variables. Overall tone 
of coverage about the military was assessed using a global attitude 
measure consisting of six 7-interval scales, including: negative/positive, 
foolish/wise, worthless/valuable, unacceptable/ acceptable, bad/ good, 
and unfavorable/favorable. The measure was developed in the 1970s 
and employed in many studies of public institutions.” Depiction of the 
trustworthiness of troops covered in news reports was assessed using a 
4-item version of the Individualized Trust Scale (ITS), which was initially 
developed by Wheeless and  grot^.^^ The abbreviated version of the ITS 
has been employed in past research with good reliability ratings.75 The 4, 
5-interval items included: dishonest/honest, untrustworthy/ trustwor- 
thy, deceptive/candid, and insincere/sincere. Finally, a single 5-interval 
scale was employed to measure the extent to which an article embodied 
episodic framing. 
Results This investigation explores whether embedded journalist cover- 
age of the first days of Operation ”Iraqi Freedom” produced qualitatively 
different coverage, news reports that were more decontextualized in 
form and more favorable in tone. To assess the study’s predictions, a 
series of one-way ANOVAs were computed: three examining the impact 
of journalist status (embedded, nonembedded, and unknown) on each of 
the three dependent variables, and three assessing the impact of the 
specific conflict (“Iraqi Freedom,” “Enduring Freedom,” and ”Desert 
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TABLE 1 
Tendencies in Frames and Tone of Newspaper Stories as a Function of Journalist Status 
Journalist Status: 
Embedded Nonembedded Unknown 
Dependent Variable 
Episodic M (s.d.) 
Overall Tone M (s.d.) 
Trust of Troops M (s.d.) 
STORY FRAMES 
4.56” (0.80) 2.82 (1.47) 3.60 (1.41) 
( n  = 93) (n  = 156) ( n  = 34) 
TONE OF COVERAGE 
4.27“ (0.71) 3.42 (0.88) 3.39 (0.94) 
( n  = 94) ( n  = 145) (n  = 32) 
4.66“ (0.60) 3.92 (0.91) 4.40 (0.86) 
( n  = 92) ( n  = 71) (n = 21) 
Note: Framing was assessed using 5-interval scales to determine the extent to which an article’s frame 
was more or less episodic. Higher scores indicate more episodic story frames. The tone of coverage was 
assessed using two scales: overall tone was measured using 7-interval scales, and trust of individual 
troops depicted in stories was measured using a 5-interval metric. In all cases, higher scores indicate 
more positive treatment of the military. 
a Significant compared to the average of nonembedded and unknown stories at p < .01. 
~ 
Storm”) on each of the dependent measures. Significant ANOVA results 
were followed up with planned comparisons, using Dunn’s multiple 
comparison procedure, to assess predicted effects and Scheffe post-hoc 
tests to examine mean differences for any unpredicted effects. Journalist 
status results are shown in Table 1; conflict means are depicted in Table 2. 
H1 predicted that, compared to nonembedded coverage, embed- 
ded journalist newspaper stories about the military, its units, and person- 
nel are more episodic in nature. The one-way ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect for reporter status on episodic framing ( F  2,280 = 
53.90, p < .01). Planned comparisons indicated that embedded journalists 
produced news reports that manifest more episodic frames than 
nonembedded or unknown reporters (F ,,280 = 48.32, p < .01). Thus, H1 
was supported. 
H2 posited that embedded coverage of Operation ”Iraqi Freedom” 
would be more favorable in tone, both toward the military generally and 
toward its personnel. One-way ANOVAs revealed significant main 
effects on the dependent variables of overall tone of coverage ( F  2,268 = 
32.42, p < .01) and depiction of the trustworthiness of troops ( F  2,181 = 
19.40, p < .01). Subsequent planned comparisons indicated that embed- 
ded journalists produced more positive news reports about the military 
than nonembedded or unknown reporters, both in their overall tone 
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TABLE 2 
Frame and Tone of Newspaper Stories across Recent U S .  Military Engagements 
Milita y Engagement: 
”Iraqi Freedom” “Enduring Freedom” ”Desert Storm” 
Dependent Variable 
Episodic Framing M (S D) 3.77“ (1.46) 2.88 (1.43) 3.58 (1.50) 
( n  = 128) ( n  = 70) (n  = 85) 
Overall Tone M (SD) 3.70 (0.93) 3.50 (0.84) 3.90b (0.95) 
(n  = 120) (n  = 67) (n  = 84) 
Note: Framing was assessed using 5-interval scales to determine the extent to which an article’s frame 
was more or less episodic. Higher scores indicate more episodic story frames. Overall tone of coverage 
of the military was measured using 7-interval scales. Higher scores indicate more positive depiction of 
the military. 
a Significant compared to the average framing of newspaper stories from operations ”Enduring 
Freedom” and “Desert Storm” at p < .01. 
Significant compared to the tone of stories from operation ”Enduring Freedom” at p < .05. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
( F  = 44.00, p < .01) and in their depictions of individual troops 
( F  = 11.83, p < .01). This pattern of results supports H2. 
H3 predicted that, because of the extensive use of embedded 
reporting during Operation ”Iraqi Freedom,” that war’s coverage would 
be more positive toward the military than coverage of ”Desert Storm” 
and “Enduring Freedom.“ The one-way ANOVAs indicated a significant 
effect on the dependent measure of overall tone of coverage (F 2,268 = 3.67, 
p < .05) , but not on trustworthiness of troops ( F  2,181 = 0.52, p = .595, 
observed power = .135). However, as Table 2 reveals, overall tone of 
coverage in ”Iraqi Freedom” was not more positive than the other 
conflicts. Post-hoc analysis revealed only one significant difference 
involving tone of coverage: that stories about ”Desert Storm” were more 
positive toward the military than those about “Enduring Freedom” 
( t  
Although it was not predicted, the one-way ANOVA indicated a 
significant difference across conflicts in the extent of episodic framing 
( F  2,28(1 = 8.52, p < .01). Post-hoc tests revealed that stories about “Iraqi 
Freedom” ( t  196 = 4.05, p < .01) and “Desert Storm” (1 153 = 2.92, p < .05) 
employed more episodic frames than those about Operation “Enduring 
Freedom.” However, mean differences between ”Iraqi Freedom” and 
“Desert Storm” were not statistically significant. 
= 2.67, p < .05). Thus, H3 was not supported. 
Discussion The U. S. military’s decision to embed journalists in combat units 
during Operation “Iraqi Freedom” was unprecedented in its scope and 
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a sharp contrast to past conflicts in which access of journalists was 
re~tr ic ted.~~ To date, however, there has been no systematic attempt to 
determine whether embedded coverage was different, either in form or 
tone. Some critics charged that embedded coverage would produce 
biased coverage, favoring the military. During Operation ”Iraqi Free- 
dom,“ one critic asserted that, “They‘re so embedded with the troops, 
they may as well be getting a P.R. retainer from the Pentagon.”77 How- 
ever, there had been no hard data on the effects of embedding78 beyond 
the personal opinions of journalists and academics. 
This study anticipated that embedded coverage would produce 
more decontextualized coverage, manifesting itself in more episodic 
framing of stories. The results supported this expectation. Compared to 
nonembedded coverage, embedded journalists in Operation ”Iraqi Free- 
dom” produced news stories that featured more episodic frames. When 
stories about “Iraqi Freedom” were compared with those from “Desert 
Storm” and ”Enduring Freedom,” the results revealed more episodic 
framing in news reports about Operations ”Iraqi Freedom” and ”Desert 
Storm” compared to ”Enduring Freedom.” Stories about ”Iraqi Free- 
dom” appeared to feature more episodic framing than those from 
”Desert Storm,” but differences in means were not statistically signifi- 
cant. 
Iyengar argues that television, mainly because it is a visual me- 
dium that places a premium on exemplars, relies much more heavily on 
episodic framing.7y The results of this study indicate that the embedding 
of journalists in combat units in war is a special circumstance that 
produces the same effect, but with print journalism. When reporters are 
embedded, they produce stories that are more personalized, based on the 
experiences of the troops and the units covered. This is, indeed, a narrow 
slice, “a snapshot,”80 of the broader war, what Kaplan calls ”vertical 
depth but little horizontal scope.’’81 In this sense, the results of this study 
replicate the experiences of the Falklands War, where embedding “led to 
an emphasis on the minutiae of the conflict at the expense of the big 
picture.”82 One consequence of increased focus on the “minutiae” of 
conflict is to lose sight of larger issues, in particular, war’s purpose and 
the impact of specific operations on that broad design. 
This study also anticipated that embedded reporting produces 
print news coverage that is more favorable in tone, both toward the 
military, generally, and toward its personnel in particular. This expecta- 
tion was based on the fact that embedding makes journalists members, 
albeit temporarily, of individual military units. This allows journalists to 
come to know the troops they are covering and to internalize the values 
of the military unit they are embedded in. 
The results supported this expectation. Results revealed that em- 
bedded coverage of “Iraqi Freedom” was more favorable in overall tone 
toward the military and in depiction of individual troops. However, 
despite the magnitude of the embedding employed in ”Iraqi Freedom,” 
it did not produce more positive coverage compared to recent conflicts. 
In fact, the only significant finding across conflicts was that the first five 
days of ”Desert Storm” produced more positive coverage than did 
”Enduring Freedom.” 
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This positive bias can be explained by the fact that embedded 
journalists get to know the troops they are covering, producing increased 
levels of relational coupled with the fact that journalists, espe- 
cially in dangerous combat conditions, experience “swift trust,” accept- 
ing, to some degree, the military’s values.@ This finding confirms the 
hard evidence that ”feelings of camaraderie” affected objectivity during 
the Falklands War,s5 and supports anecdotal opinions of those journal- 
ists who argued that embedding carries the potential to bias coverage.86 
Of course, bias is a double-edge sword. For the military, embed- 
ding provided a close-up view of combat operations that met all three of 
its possible motivations for implementing this strategy: it served as an 
effective counterbalance to enemy misinformation; it permitted news 
consumers to observe, first hand, the effectiveness of American fighting 
forces; and it provided a positive spin to news coverage. However, for the 
journalism establishment, embedding embodies a ”professionally treach- 
erous” reef. Journalists get to cover combat operations close up, giving 
them the access to combat operations that they want. But, in the process, 
they lose perspective and, thus, sacrifice the idealized standard of 
reporter object i~i ty .~~ 
The results of this investigation simply indicate that embedding 
alters the nature and tone of coverage. These are the facts, which we hope 
will inform military public affairs decision making and journalist prac- 
tices. A larger question concerns the practice of embedding in other 
reporting contexts (e.g., coverage of presidential campaigns, protest 
movements, terrorist groups, etc.) and whether it produces similar 
effects. 
We posit one caveat about the results of this study. The coding was 
done by Department of Defense public affairs personnel, who were 
students in the Department of Defense Joint Course in Communication 
at the University of Oklahoma. Because of their military ties, coding may 
have been biased toward the military. However, coding was conducted 
under the direct supervision of the first author, their professor, and a 
doctoral student. In addition, any bias would have affected both embed- 
ded and nonembedded coverage, thus not undermining the main find- 
ings of this study. 
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